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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discuss outcome from data simulation carried out for the research. 
Secondary data was used for analysis and was analyzed using econometrics 
specification with Eviews 6.  
 
4.2 Summary Statistic 
The sample consists of Malaysia PLC years observation on Data Stream from 1997 to 
2008.The primary test are based on a sample of 1200 firm-year observation 
comprising of 100 firms.  Test that requires cash flow (lagged cash flow) data reduce 
the sample to 791 (786) observations. Further analysis on short term debt (lagged 
short term debt) is based on a sample of 768 (766) firm-year observations. Sample 
sizes for analyzing that require contemporaneous and lagged managerial equity 
ownership are based on 791 (790) firm year observations. Table 4.1 presents the 
descriptive analysis of input data. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistic 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
VALUE 0.39 -0.21 19.11 -1.03 2.08 
INT 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.02 
EARN 0.07 0.07 11.50 -4.65 0.43 
RD 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
DIV 0.02 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.06 
CAPEX 0.04 0.03 0.46 0.00 0.05 
SIZE 5.29 5.21 7.18 0.00 0.67 
RATE 0.12 0.06 11.18 0.00 0.57 
CFO 0.06 0.06 0.65 -0.73 0.11 
STD 0.57 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.32 
ALIGN 0.16 0.20 0.82 -0.33 0.16 
AGE 9.18 9.00 12.00 3.00 2.80 
FORECAST_3 30.36 24.25 366.35 -85.08 81.69 
IND_GROWTH 1.99 1.90 4.50 0.30 1.08 
 
4.3 Analyses of Measures 
4.3.1 OLS Specification 
This section present results of the OLS regression of market value (VALUE) on 
contemporaneous interest (INT). Previous study has found that there is a negative 
relation between firm value and contemporaneous interest. Analysis for this study 
shows similar results, which contemporaneous interest has a negative relation with 
firm value. The result is summarized in Table 4.2 (OLS Specification). 
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Table 4.2:  
Relation between Firm Value and Debt; OLS vs Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
estimation 
 
OLS Specification Hausman (1978) test 2SLS specification 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.35 -4.47 -0.37 -3.90 -1.89 -4.36 
INT -8.75 4.07 15.62 3.38 
  ERROR 
  
-2.77 -0.39 
  INT_2SLS 
    
6.33 3.56 
EARN 0.31 1.13 0.35 1.14 0.22 0.73 
RD 175.55 15.34 176.60 15.25 162.65 13.68 
DIV 21.50 23.55 20.87 22.26 20.17 21.36 
CAPEX 
    
3.00 2.85 
SIZE 
    
0.27 3.26 
Adjusted R2 0.51 
 
0.52 
 
0.52 
 Observations 871 
 
791 
 
791 
 
 
 The regression for OLS specification can be generating as follow: 
 
VALUE = -0.35 – 8.75INT + 0.31EARN +175.55R&D +21.50DIV  
 
R2 = 51% of the variation in firm value is explained collectively by the variable in the 
model. Overall test shows significant relationship between dependent and independent 
variable. Only EARN is insignificant coefficients in the primary equations. The 
coefficient for INT is -8.75 and insignificant with t-stat of 4.07. 
 
Therefore the OLS specification conducted has shown that there is a negative 
insignificant relationship between firm value and contemporaneous interest once 
controlling variables such as EARN, R&D and DIV is applied. This result consistent 
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with what was summarized in previous research by Fama & French (1998). Thus it is 
not consistent with MM theorem which emphasized that there is a positive relation 
between firm value and debt. 
 
4.3.2 Hausman (1978) Test of endogeneity 
Hausman (1978) test is conducted to test endogeneity of contemporaneous debt (INT) 
in the primary equation. The test is done in two stages. In stage one the suspected 
endogenous variable is regressed on an instrument and the other exogenous variables 
from the primary equation. In this research the suspected endogenous variable is 
contemporaneous interest. Following prior research by Rajan & Zingales (1995) and 
Frank & Goyal (2004), lagged interest expense is used as the instrument. Lagged 
value from interest expense act as a good exogenous instrument because today’s firm 
value cannot influence yesterday’s interest, thereby avoiding simultaneity. Since firm 
value is the present value of future cash flows, lagged values of interest are unlikely to 
be correlated with the error. Furthermore (Welch, 2004) argue that lagged interest is 
highly correlated with contemporaneous interest, indicating that it is a good 
instrument. The first stage of Hausman (1978) test is as stipulated in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3:  
First Stage Regression for Hausman Test 
Dependent Variable: INT 
   Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
  Date: 04/22/10   Time: 23:52 
   Sample (adjusted): 1998 2008 
   Periods included: 11 
    Cross-sections included: 33 
   Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 220 
  Instrument list: C L_INT EARN RD DIV 
  
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
L_INT 0.94 0.03 32.52 0.00 
EARN -0.04 0.00 -11.18 0.00 
RD 0.05 0.05 0.96 0.34 
DIV 0.05 0.01 3.08 0.00 
C 0.00 0.00 2.88 0.00 
R-squared 0.881475     Mean dependent var 0.013875 
Adjusted R-squared 0.87927     S.D. dependent var 0.018157 
S.E. of regression 0.006309     Sum squared resid 0.008557 
F-statistic 399.7424     Durbin-Watson stat 1.807838 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Second-Stage SSR 0.008557 
Instrument rank 5 
   
 
In the first stage regression as shown in Table 4.3, the result for lagged interest 
(L_INT) coefficient is positive (0.94) and highly correlated with contemporaneous 
interest which consistent with (Welch, 2004) argument. From the regression 
specification, estimation on residual (ERROR) and predicted interest (INT_2SLS) is 
gather. 
 
ERROR is then incorporated into firm value OLS specification to ascertain the 
endogeneity of contemporaneous interest. Table 4.2 (Hausman (1978) test) shows the 
results of OLS specification with incorporation of ERROR. The estimated residual 
(ERROR) is negative (-2.77) and statistically significant (t=-0.39), which suggest that 
INT is endogenous and should be instrumented by INT_2SLS. 
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4.4 Testing of Hypotheses 
4.4.1 Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) specification 
In the two-stage least square estimation, the predicted value (INT_2SLS) from 4.3.2 is 
use to replace the endogenous variable (INT). As mention in 3.2.3 inadequate controls 
for future profitability could affect the relation between firm value and debt. 
Therefore, to address this situation additional control variables is introduce; capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) is added to better control for the firm future profitability and 
firm size (SIZE), defined as log sales to control for other firm level factors. 
 
The estimation result is as shown in Table 4.2 (2SLS specification). The outcome 
shows that once endogeneity of contemporaneous debt is corrected, there is a positive 
significant relation between firm value and debt. The coefficient of INT_2SLS is 6.33 
with t-stat at 3.56. The specification then can be generated as follow: 
 
VALUE = -1.89 + 6.33INT_2SLS + 0.22EARN +162.65R&D + 20.17DIV + 
3.00CAPEX + 0.27SIZE 
 
R2 = 51% of the variation in firm value is explained collectively by the variable in the 
model. Overall test shows significant relationship between dependent and independent 
variable. Only EARN has insignificant coefficients. This result support Hypotheses 1 
which says that: 
H1: There is a positive relation between firm value and debt, once endogeneity of 
contemporaneous debt is corrected using a two-stage least squares estimation. 
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4.4.2 Alternate Interpretation 
This section presented alternate theories (based on agency and signaling hypotheses), 
that might be consistent with the positive relation between firm value and debt. 
 
4.4.2.1 Free Cash Flow Theory 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) argues that debt reduces the agency costs of free cash 
flows by reducing cash flows that is available for spending at the discretion of 
managers. As a results, the reduction in agency costs leads to an increase in firm 
value. To discriminate between the tax theory and agency theory, the relation between 
firm value and debt is analyze with additional controls for the firm’s cash flow from 
operation (CFO). 
 
Table 4.4:  
Distinguishing between the tax and agency explanations of debt – Free cash flows 
 
Contemporaneous Cash Flow Lagged Cash Flow 
 
(CFO) (L_CFO) 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -1.80 -4.15 -1.88 -4.33 
INT_2SLS 4.81 3.21 8.56 3.64 
CFO 1.66 2.64 
  L_CFO 
  
2.14 3.64 
EARN 0.15 0.50 0.25 0.79 
RD 161.68 13.64 159.29 13.42 
DIV 18.77 17.39 18.38 17.55 
CAPEX 2.34 2.16 2.43 2.28 
SIZE 0.25 2.99 0.24 3.00 
Adjusted R2 0.52 
 
0.53 
 Observations 791 
 
786 
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Table 4.4 presents the results of the regression of VALUE on INT_2SLS controlling 
for contemporaneous cash flows (CFO). From the specification, the coefficient of 
INT_2SLS is 4.81 and the t-stat is 3.21 with a significant coefficient of CFO. The 
result shows that there is a positive relation between firm value and debt after 
controlling for the level of cash flow. The regression specification for CFO can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
VALUE = -1.8 + 4.81INT_2SLS + 1.66CFO + 0.15EARN + 161.68R&D + 18.77DIV 
+ 2.34CAPEX + 0.25SIZE + ε 
 
To ensure that the analysis is not influenced by the possible endogeneity of 
contemporaneous cash flows, second analysis is conducted based on lagged cash flow 
(L_CFO). The results in Table 4.4 shows similar results, with the coefficient of 
INT_2SLS is positive (8.56) and significant (t=3.64) after controlling for L_CFO. The 
regression specification for L_CFO can be summarized as follows: 
 
VALUE = -1.88 + 8.56INT_2SLS + 2.14L_CFO + 0.25EARN + 159.29R&D + 
18.38DIV + 2.43CAPEX + 0.24SIZE + ε 
 
Both results from the regression specification support hypotheses 1a, which is: 
H1a: There is a positive relation between firm value and debt even after controlling for 
the level of free cash flows. 
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4.4.2.2 Debt Signaling Hypotheses 
 To distinguish between the signaling and the tax hypotheses, the role of short term 
debt is incorporated. In this analysis the ratio of short term debt to total debt (STD) is 
include as additional control in the primary regression to test this alternate 
interpretation. Table 4.5 present the results of regression specification of VALUE on 
INT_2SLS with an additional control for contemporaneous short term debt (STD).  
 
Table 4.5:  
Distinguishing between the tax and signaling hypotheses of debt – Short term debt 
 
Contemporaneous short term debt Lagged short term debt 
 
(STD) (L_STD) 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -1.73 -3.69 -1.79 -3.77 
INT_2SLS 6.26 3.44 10.65 3.91 
STD -0.17 -0.96 
  L_STD 
  
-0.18 -1.05 
EARN 0.19 0.62 0.38 1.20 
RD 162.31 13.46 162.93 13.52 
DIV 20.05 20.63 19.84 20.20 
CAPEX 2.80 2.59 3.02 2.81 
SIZE 0.26 3.06 0.26 3.02 
Adjusted R2 0.52 
 
0.52 
 Observations 768 
 
766 
 
 
The results shows coefficient of INT_2SLS is 6.26 and significant with t-stat 3.44. 
This shows that there is a positive relation between firm value and debt after 
controlling for STD. Further to that, STD coefficient is negative (-0.17) which is not 
consistent with the theory of Flannery (1986) which suggested that firms issuing short 
term debt are of a higher quality. The regression specification for STD can be 
summarized as follows: 
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VALUE = -1.73 + 6.26INT_2SLS - 0.17STD + 0.19EARN + 162.31R&D + 20.05DIV 
+ 2.80CAPEX + 0.26SIZE + ε 
 
To ensure that the analysis is not influenced by the possible endogeneity of 
contemporaneous short term debt, second analysis is conducted based on lagged short 
term debt (L_STD). The results in Table 4.5 for lagged short term debt shows similar 
results with the coefficient of INT_2SLS is positive (10.65) and significant (t=3.91) 
after controlling for L_STD. The regression specification for STD can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
VALUE = α0 + 10.65INT_2SLS - 0.18L_STD + 0.38EARN + 162.93R&D + 
19.84DIV + 3.02CAPEX + 0.26SIZE + ε 
 
Both results from the regression specification support hypotheses 1b, which says that: 
H1b: There is a positive relation between firm value and debt even after controlling for 
STD 
 
4.5 Role of managerial alignment in the relation between firm value and debt 
This section explores how the level of managerial alignment influences the relation 
between firm value and debt. Following Berger, Ofek, & Yermack (1977), the proxy 
of managerial alignment is based on level of stock and option based compensation. To 
evaluate the impact of managerial alignment on the relation between firm value and 
38 
 
debt, INT_2SLS is interact with ALIGN (INT_2SLS*ALIGN). Table 4.6 presents the 
results of regression specification using contemporaneous ALIGN.  
 
Table 4.6:  
Role of managerial alignment in the relation between firm value and debt 
 
Contemporaneous alignment Lagged alignment 
 
(ALIGN) (L_ALIGN) 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -1.85 -4.25 -1.90 -4.40 
INT_2SLS 10.44 4.23 11.42 4.55 
INT_2SLS*ALIGN -33.51 -2.74 
  ALIGN 1.73 3.36 
  INT_2SLS*L_ALIGN 
  
-41.11 -4.29 
L_ALIGN 
  
2.43 4.93 
EARN 0.28 0.92 0.18 0.59 
RD 157.19 13.17 154.09 13.00 
DIV 19.77 20.86 19.78 21.14 
CAPEX 2.73 2.60 2.67 2.56 
SIZE 0.22 2.65 0.22 2.66 
Adjusted R2 0.53 
 
0.54 
 Observations 791 
 
790 
 
 
The result shows coefficient of INT_2SLS*ALIGN is negative (-33.51) as expected 
and significant with t-stat -2.74. Further to that, the standalone INT_2SLS is positive 
(10.44) and significant with t-stat 4.23, which indicate that with no managerial 
alignment, there is a positive relation between firm value and debt. This shows that 
more aligned manager’s issues more debt which would reduce the equilibrium 
relation between firm value and debt. 
 
To ensure that the analysis is not influenced by the possible endogeneity of 
contemporaneous alignment, second analysis is conducted based on lagged alignment 
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(L_ALIGN). The results in for lagged alignment in Table 4.6 are similar with the 
coefficient of INT_2SLS*L_ALIGN is negative (-41.11) and significant (t=-4.29) after 
controlling for L_ALIGN. 
 
Both analyses from the regression specification support hypotheses 1c, which is: 
H1c: The positive relation between firm value and debt is decreasing in the level of 
managerial alignment. 
 
4.6 Robustness Test 
4.6.1 Alternate empirical specification. 
This section examine if the results are being driven by outliers. While all variables 
have been truncated at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentile annually, robust regression is 
employ to control the influence of outliers. Robust regression results for alternate 
empirical specification is as shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7:  
Alternate empirical specifications 
 
Robust Regression Cross-Sectional 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -3.17 -1.49 -1.91 -3.18 
INT_2SLS 7.35 2.36 3.51 1.85 
EARN 0.25 0.69 0.07 0.18 
RD 106.24 3.25 160.00 3.75 
DIV -4.67 -0.76 20.27 6.25 
CAPEX 0.16 0.15 2.94 2.28 
SIZE 0.62 1.59 0.28 2.58 
Observations 791 
 
100 
 
 
The coefficient of INT_2SLS is 7.35 and significant with t-stat 2.36. This indicates 
that the relation between firm value and debt is not sensitive to outliers. 
 
In the cross sectional (between-firm) regression the sample size reduce to 100 due to 
the number of firms in the sample. Table 4.7 (Cross-sectional) shows a positive 
INT_2SLS at 3.51 and significant with t-stat 1.85. The positive relation between firm 
value and debt appear to be robust to alternate empirical specifications. 
 
4.6.2 Additional firm and industry level controls 
It is possible that correlated omitted firm level factors contribute to the positive 
relation between firm value and debt. While all regression includes firm fixed effects, 
the fixed effects might not capturing time-varying firm factors. To control for possible 
time-varying omitted variables, an additional control variable AGE is introduce to the 
primary regression. The specification results are as shown in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8:  
Additional controls for firm and industry level factors 
 
AGE FORECAST_3 IND_GROWTH 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -4.03 -5.46 -4.38 -3.92 -1.37 -2.96 
INT_2SLS 7.12 5.97 5.91 8.00 5.70 3.44 
EARN 0.43 1.64 2.06 2.30 0.23 0.76 
RD 402.44 6.46 -335.08 -1.49 158.28 13.29 
DIV 13.63 11.69 11.47 8.31 20.44 21.68 
CAPEX -0.10 -0.04 5.51 1.37 2.36 2.21 
SIZE 0.54 3.83 0.62 3.02 0.25 3.04 
AGE 0.03 0.93 
    FORECAST_3 
  
0.01 0.85 
  IND_GROWTH 
    
0.20 3.13 
Adjusted R2 0.81 
 
0.94 
 
0.53 
 Observations 100 
 
636 
 
791 
 
 
From Table 4.8, when applying AGE as the control variable, the coefficient for 
INT_2SLS is positive (7.12) and significant with t-stat 5.97. This shows that the 
relation between firm value and debt does not being influences by omitted time-
varying firm factors. 
 
Next analysis is to include three years forecast of future earnings (FORECAST_3) as 
an additional control for the firm’s future profitability. Table 4.8 shows that the 
positive relation between VALUE and INT_2SLS remains significant when applying 
additional control for future profitability. The coefficient of INT_2SLS is 5.91 with t-
stat of 8.00. Further to that, FORECAST_3 is positive (0.01) and significant with t-stat 
of 0.85. 
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Finally in assessing the robustness of the results is to apply control for industry 
factors. An additional control variable is introduced which is the industry growth 
opportunities (IND_GROWTH). The results are presented in Table 4.8. The 
coefficient of INT_2SLS is positive at 5.70 and significant with t-stat of 3.44 when 
applying industry growth as additional control variable. IND_GROWTH is positive 
(0.20) and significant (t=3.13). 
 
4.6.3 Other robustness tests. 
There are possibilities that the control variables used in the regression are also 
endogeneous. The relation between VALUE and INT_2SLS then regress using lagged 
values for all the control variables. The results are as shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9:  
Robustness tests – All lagged control variables 
 
Pooled Robust 
 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -2.23 -3.64 0.09 0.10 
INT_2SLS 1.72 2.87 1.47 2.72 
L_EARN 0.60 1.41 0.38 0.92 
L_RD 133.33 3.77 20.54 0.55 
L_DIV 21.58 7.98 2.77 0.66 
L_CAPEX 2.44 2.18 -1.03 -1.06 
L_SIZE 0.33 2.98 0.01 0.07 
Observations 779 
 
779 
 
 
The results show that there is a positive relation between firm value and interest in a 
specification that uses lagged controls. The coefficient of INT_2SLS is positive at 1.72 
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and 1.47 and the t-stat is 2.87 and 2.72 in the pooled and robust regression 
respectively. 
 
4.7 Summary of Research Results 
This study found that from the primary equation regression specification, the outcome 
result is not consistent with MM theorem. The similar results were also discovered in 
previous research. The outcome from the primary analysis would shows that 
contemporaneous interest expense is a suspected endogeneous variable. Therefore 
Hausman (1978) test is conducted to proof that interest expense is indeed endogenous 
and gather the information on predicted interest expense value in two stage least 
square specification. 
 
The Hausman test proof that interest expense which instrumented by lagged interest is 
indeed endogeneous and should be replacing with the predicted interest expense. The 
regression specification then shown that there is positive relation between firm value 
and debt once endogeneity of contemporaneous debt is corrected using two stage least 
square method with additional controlling on firm future profitability and firm size.  
 
Controlling for future cash flows and short term debt does not have a significant 
influence on the relation between firm value and debt. With these controlling 
variables, the relation between firm value and debt is positive. The analysis also found 
that the coefficient of short term debt is negative, which does not consistent with 
Flannery (1986) theory that firms issuing short term debt are of a higher quality. This 
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concludes that low quality firms would be willing to issue short term debt to signal 
their high type to the market. High quality firms, on the other hand would be prefer to 
treat as average type and issue long term debt. 
 
Managerial alignment shows a significant influence in the relation between firm value 
and debt. The results shows that more aligned manager intends to issue more debt. 
This proof that managers who act in the interest of the shareholders would take on 
more debt and hence the positive relation between firm value and debt would be lower 
for these firms. 
 
Further to that, the standalone coefficient of INT_2SLS is positive (10.44) and 
significant (t=4.23) which indicate positive relation between firm value and debt for 
firms with no managerial alignment. Although the coefficient of 10.44 for INT_2SLS 
is high, the median interest to debt ratio (RATE) from Table 4.1 for this sample is 
0.06, which amount to tax benefit of 63 cents per ringgit of debt. Hence firms with no 
managerial alignment have higher tax benefits of debt of (63 cents) than the average 
firm in the sample which is 38 cents (Table 4.2). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
